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Abstract 
The ability to segment ongoing activity into meaningful events is integral for event 
understanding and memory. Neuroimaging and behavioral studies suggest that Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) could impair some of the mechanisms of event 
segmentation, and that this may hurt subsequent memory. To test this hypothesis, 145 
participants completed event segmentation and memory tasks; tests of working memory, 
episodic memory, general knowledge, executive function, and processing speed; and 
questionnaires assessing severity of PTSD symptoms, dissociation, and perceived social 
support. PTSD, dissociation, and perceived social support explained unique variance in 
event segmentation performance. Furthermore, social support explained unique variance 
in event memory. Difficulty segmenting events may affect PTSD patients’ ability to 
interpret the activity occurring around them, and interventions aimed at improving event 
encoding may help compensate for memory disruptions in PTSD. 
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Introduction 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a disabling disorder that 6.8% of 
American adults have experienced in their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005). According to 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), PTSD is an anxiety disorder caused by exposure to a traumatic event 
that produces intense fear, helplessness or horror in the victim. Symptoms of PTSD 
include reexperiencing (e.g., flashbacks), avoidance and numbing (e.g., avoidance of 
thoughts or places related to the trauma), and increased arousal (e.g., hypervigilance).  
These symptoms can severely interfere with daily functioning, often limiting a person’s 
ability to work, raise a family, and participate in other activities of daily life.  
While combat-related trauma is often considered the prevailing cause of PTSD, 
other traumatic events such as sexual trauma, car accidents, and natural disasters are also 
leading precursors of the disorder. Among combat veterans, lifetime PTSD prevalence is 
as high as 24-31% (Blake et al., 1990; Weiss et al., 1992), among rape victims, 47% were 
found to have chronic PTSD 3 months post-trauma (Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, Murdock, & 
Walsh, 1992), and among vehicular accident survivors 23% met criteria for PTSD 4-6 
months post-accident (Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001).  
 
Memory 
In addition to the symptoms of PTSD discussed in the DSM-IV, people with 
PTSD often report other cognitive difficulties, such as deficits in declarative memory. 
Research in this area has been extensive, and while the results have not been in complete 
accord, there is strong evidence for memory and other cognitive deficits in populations of 
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PTSD patients. Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker (1998) studied combat-veterans 
and found that participants with PTSD displayed greater difficulty than non-PTSD 
patients on a test of learning and categorized recall and on a test of short and long 
delayed recall. Furthermore, Vietnam veterans with PTSD displayed deficits on tests of 
sustained attention, working memory, and learning of verbal information (Vasterling et 
al., 2002).  
Further research demonstrates that these memory deficits are unlikely to be due 
solely to other comorbid disorders. Gilberton, Gurvits, Lasko, Orr, and Pitman (2001) 
found that combat veterans with PTSD displayed deficits on memory tasks, even after 
controlling for the effects of comorbid depression, alcohol history, and intelligence. In 
addition, rape survivors without histories of alcohol or substance abuse performed more 
poorly on tasks requiring memory and attention than rape survivors without PTSD and 
non-rape survivors without PTSD. The difference between the groups remained 
significant after controlling for comorbid depression (Jenkins, Langlais, Delis, & Cohen, 
1998; Jenkins, Langlais, Delis, & Cohen, 2000). 
These cognitive deficits are also unlikely to be fully accounted for by premorbid 
intelligence differences between groups. Gil, Caley, Greenberg, Kugelmass, and Lerer 
(1990) compared pre-combat intelligence scores to post-combat scores, and found that 
the IQ scores of the PTSD group deteriorated significantly after the participants 
developed PTSD. Specifically, participants with PTSD demonstrated decreased scores on 
measures of memory, attention, and verbal fluency. These studies therefore suggest that 
the memory and cognitive deficits found in populations of people with PTSD are likely 
due to the disorder rather than to either pre-morbid or co-morbid conditions. 
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Dissociation 
People who experience traumatic events often report experiencing one or more 
dissociative symptoms, and peritraumatic dissociation at the time of a traumatic event has 
been found to predict later PTSD symptoms. Dissociation can take the form of out-of-
body experiences, disruptions in perceived passage of time, and seeming unreality or 
distortions of the surrounding environment, among others (Marshall, Orlando, Jaycox, 
Foy, & Belzberg, 2002). Marmar et al. (1994) studied male Vietnam Theater veterans and 
found that peritraumatic dissociation, as measured by the Peritraumatic Dissociative 
Experiences Questionnaire (PDEQ), was highly correlated with PTSD scores on the 
Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD. This relationship held after controlling for 
level of war zone stress exposure and stress response. In addition, in a study of female 
Vietnam Theater veterans, Tichenor, Marmar, Weiss, Metzler, & Ronfeldt (1996) found a 
significant correlation between peritraumatic dissociation and scores on the intrusion and 
avoidance scales of the Impact of Events Scale. Surprisingly, the authors did not find a 
strong relationship between peritraumatic dissociation and PTSD as measured by the 
Mississippi Scale. The authors suggest that their disparate finding was likely due to 
restriction of range in the PTSD scores on the Mississippi Scale for the female Vietnam 
veterans, as the female veterans in this study had generally lower scores on this scale than 
the male veterans in the previous study.  
A major limitation of these studies is that the authors assessed peritraumatic 
dissociation retrospectively.  Shalev, Peri, Canetti, & Schreiber (1996) recruited 51 
trauma survivors who were admitted into a hospital in Jerusalem. Peritraumatic 
dissociation measured between 2-6 days after hospital admission predicted PTSD status 
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as measured by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R—Non Patient Version 
six-months post-trauma. Furthermore, in a multiple regression model, peritraumatic 
dissociation explained 29.4% of the variance in Mississippi scale scores. Birmes et al. 
(2003) provide further support for this relationship, finding that in a population of 35 
victims of violent assault, participants who developed PTSD three months post-trauma 
had significantly higher peritraumatic dissociation scores within 24 hours of the assault 
than participants who did not develop PTSD. In addition, peritraumatic dissociation 
accounted for 25.8% of the variance in PTSD symptoms measured three months after the 
trauma. These studies provide strong support for the association between peritraumatic 
dissociation and later development of PTSD symptoms.  
In addition to peritraumatic dissociation, researchers have repeatedly found that 
level of trait dissociation, often measured by the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), is 
related to severity of PTSD symptoms. Bremner et al. (1992), for example, studied 51 
Vietnam combat veterans with and without PTSD and found that veterans with PTSD had 
scores on the DES that were two times higher than veterans without PTSD. The authors 
also found a significant correlation between trait dissociative symptoms and PTSD 
symptoms measured on the Mississippi Scale. These results held after controlling for 
extent of combat exposure. Furthermore, Marmar et al. (1994), found that trait 
dissociation in male Vietnam Theater veterans was highly correlated with PTSD 
symptom severity after controlling for war zone stress exposure and stress response. 
There is therefore robust evidence that both forms of dissociation are strongly related to 
PTSD. 
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Social Support 
 Lack of perceived social support after experiencing a traumatic event is widely 
believed to influence the development and severity of PTSD symptoms. One of the first 
studies on the relationship between perceived social support and PTSD found that social 
network size and emotional support were significantly reduced in Vietnam veterans with 
PTSD compared to Vietnam veterans without PTSD and a sample of medical-service 
inpatients without combat exposure. These results were not due to pre-combat social 
support, as all three groups reported similar levels of social support prior to the war. The 
authors suggest that low levels of post-combat social support interacted with the stressors 
of combat to produce increasing levels of PTSD over time (Keane, Scott, Chavoya, 
Lamparski, & Fairbank, 1985). 
 Hyman, Gold, and Cott (2003), delved deeper into the relationship between social 
support and PTSD, determining the specific areas of social support that are most related 
to the development of PTSD. For a sample of 172 adult female survivors of childhood 
sexual abuse, the authors found that the perceived availability of someone willing to 
listen to one’s problems (appraisal support) and one’s ability to make positive 
comparisons of oneself to others (self-esteem support) were the best predictors of PTSD 
symptoms, explaining 10.6% of the variance in PTSD symptoms. Of these two, self-
esteem support explained the most variance in PTSD symptoms, suggesting two possible 
explanations: (1) Self-esteem support counteracts the negative effects of self-blame 
common in this population, and (2) higher PTSD symptom severity drives away people 
who would otherwise provide self-esteem support.  
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 Again, a limitation of these studies is that they are cross-sectional, rather than 
prospective and longitudinal. However, Solomon, Mikulincer, & Avitzur (1988) followed 
Lebanon war veterans from two years to three years post-war. First, cross-sectional 
results from each of the two time-points support the research discussed above in that 
lower levels of perceived social support were strongly related to the severity of PTSD 
symptoms. More importantly, the authors found that social support was significantly 
correlated with changes in the severity of PTSD symptoms over the one-year period of 
study. Unfortunately, though, this study is still unable to provide evidence for a 
directional causal relationship between social support and PTSD, as a decrease in PTSD 
symptom severity could lead to an increase in availability of social support just as an 
increase in social support could lead to a decrease in PTSD symptoms.  
 
Cognitive Deficits in Subclinical PTSD 
 Traumatic events are unfortunately exceedingly common for people in the United 
States and other countries. Breslau, Chilcoat, Kessler, and Davis (1999) found that of the 
general population of Detroit, Michigan, 61.4% of the participants had experienced at 
least one traumatic event and 39.2% had experienced two or more traumatic events. In 
Sweden, over 80% of the participants surveyed had experienced at least one traumatic 
event (Frans, Rimmö, Åberg, & Fredrikson, 2005) and in Australia, the percentage was 
greater than 57% (Creamer, McFarlane, & Burgess, 2005). While only a relatively small 
portion of these participants would likely have been diagnosed with clinical PTSD, a 
much larger percentage would likely have displayed at least one symptom of PTSD. In 
fact, many of the cognitive deficits discussed above hold, albeit to a lesser degree, for 
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people who meet some, but not all, of the criteria for PTSD. Lindem et al. (2003), for 
example, assessed PTSD symptoms using the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale and 
ranked symptoms on a continuous scale by calculating the frequency and intensity of the 
symptoms. PTSD symptom severity was correlated with difficulty learning and retrieving 
verbal information, deficits in short term memory, and variability in reaction time on a 
sustained attention task. It is likely that other cognitive tasks would show similar patterns 
across severity levels of PTSD.  
   
Neural Correlates of PTSD: The Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
One of the most robust findings in the PTSD imaging literature is a decrease in 
activity in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) of participants with PTSD 
compared to healthy controls. The rostral ACC  (Brodmann’s area 25, part of area 24, and 
part of area 32) interacts with many areas involved in emotion processing, including the 
amygdala and insula (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Unsurprisingly, then, the studies that 
have found less activation in this area tend to involve tasks that include emotional 
stimuli. Bremner et al. (2004), for example, conducted a PET study comparing the 
performance of women with childhood sexual abuse related PTSD to healthy controls on 
three types of Stroop tasks: a typical color-naming Stroop task, an emotional Stroop task 
in which participants were asked to name the color of emotional, rather than color, words, 
and a control task in which participants named the color of a string of Xs. During the 
color-naming Stroop task, both the PTSD and control participants displayed an increase 
in activity in the ACC compared to the control task. However, only the non-PTSD control 
group displayed an increase in blood flow to the ACC during the emotional Stroop task; 
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activity in the right ACC (Brodmann’s area 32) for the PTSD group decreased 
significantly compared to the color-naming task. 
Bremner et al. (1999a) found similar results when they asked female survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse with and without PTSD to recount narratives of their trauma and 
then listen to them during PET imaging. Compared to brain activity while listening to 
non-trauma related narratives, participants with PTSD displayed deactivation in one area 
of the ACC (right subcallosal gyrus, Brodmann’s area 25) and failure of activation in 
another area (Brodmann’s area 32) when listening to trauma-related narratives. 
Participants without PTSD did not display significant differences in ACC activation 
between the two types of narratives. Bremner et al. (1999b) found similar results in a 
population of combat veterans. When exposed to traumatic pictures and sounds, veterans 
with PTSD displayed decreased activation in the left ACC (Brodmann’s area 32) and 
decreased activation in right and left subcollosal gyrus (Brodmann’s area 25). Based on 
these results, the authors suggest that the brain’s typical response to traumatic stimuli is 
to activate the rostral ACC, and that this type of activation fails to occur in people with 
PTSD.  
On the other hand, recent studies have found that people with PTSD tend to 
display hyperactivation of dorsal ACC (part of Brodmann’s areas 32 and 24), an area that 
is typically involved in tasks such as performance monitoring, response selection, and 
error detection (Shin et al. 2009). For example, Fronzo et al. (2010) compared the 
performance of women with PTSD related to intimate-partner violence to control 
participants on a face matching task, and found bilateral increases in activity in the dorsal 
ACC for the participants with PTSD when face targets were male compared to when face 
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targets were female. In addition, Bryant et al. (2005) found hyperactivity in the dorsal 
ACC of people with PTSD in an auditory oddball task that was unrelated to trauma and 
emotional processing. In a similar study, Felmingham et al. (2009) used the same 
auditory oddball task but also measured skin conductance response to target tones as a 
measure of autonomic arousal. The authors found that during target trials in which 
participants displayed a skin conductance response, participants with PTSD displayed 
greater dorsal ACC activation than controls. The authors suggest that the results of both 
of these studies may indicate that people with PTSD display increased attention, 
vigilance, and processing of salient stimuli, consistent with the hyperarousal symptoms of 
PTSD. 
In addition, Britton, Phan, Taylor, Fig, & Liberzon (2005) found that compared to 
combat veterans without PTSD, combat veterans with PTSD displayed increased activity 
in the dorsal ACC while listening to a personalized script of their traumatic event. 
Furthermore, Shin et al. (2001) used an emotional Stroop task comparing combat-related 
to general negative words and found greater dorsal ACC activation in combat veterans 
with PTSD compared to combat veterans without PTSD. 
Greater activation of the dorsal ACC may also be the tonic state of this area for 
people with PTSD. Shin et al. (2009) measured resting regional cerebral metabolic rate 
for glucose in veterans with PTSD, veterans without PTSD, and their identical, non-
veteran co-twins and found higher glucose metabolic rates in the PTSD/non-veteran twin 
pairs compared to the no-PTSD/non-Veteran twin pairs in the dorsal ACC. The authors 
therefore suggest that hyperactivity of the dorsal ACC may be a risk factor for PTSD.  
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Together, these studies provide strong evidence that people with PTSD display 
non-normative functioning in two major areas of the ACC: decreased activity in rostral 
ACC and hyperactivation of dorsal ACC. These findings suggest that these brain areas 
may influence the onset and symptoms of PTSD, and indicate that a greater 
understanding of how this non-normative functioning is related to PTSD would be useful 
in expanding current knowledge about the disorder.  
 Research on the ACC in other areas of psychology and neuroscience provides a 
plausible link between the non-normative ACC function seen in PTSD and some of the 
symptoms of PTSD. The ACC, particularly the dorsal ACC, is often implicated in tasks 
involving error detection and conflict monitoring (e.g., Holyroyd et al., 2004; van Veen, 
Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001). However, a more recent view of the ACC is 
that it responds in proportion to the likelihood of an error on a particular task (Brown & 
Braver, 2005). To test this hypothesis, Brown & Braver used a computational model of 
the stop-signal paradigm, and found that the model predicted an increase in activity in the 
ACC on trials with a greater likelihood of prediction error. This held even for correct 
trials in which no error was actually made. The authors then compared the model to 
human fMRI data, and found that dorsal ACC activation supported the model predictions. 
The authors therefore suggest that ACC activation increases in proportion to the 
likelihood of making an error and receiving negative reinforcement. 
 This model has not yet been studied in people with PTSD; however, based on 
previously discussed research, it is possible that people with PTSD would display 
hyperactivation of the dorsal ACC at times of greater prediction uncertainty—times when 
there is a greater likelihood of making an incorrect prediction. People with PTSD may 
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manifest this perception of greater prediction error with a heightened arousal and startle 
response to stimuli that would not elicit such a response in people without PTSD. It is 
possible that the hyperarousal symptoms of PTSD reflect this response to increased error 
perception. 
  
Event Segmentation, Error Prediction, and Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
If prediction error monitoring is disrupted in PTSD, this could affect patient’s 
comprehension of everyday events. Prediction is an integral piece of the mechanism that 
allows people to segment ongoing activity into meaningful units, an essential ability for 
event understanding and memory. People constantly perform this type of segmentation 
throughout their daily lives. For example, when asked about what one did to get ready in 
the morning, one might mention waking up, getting out of bed, putting on clothes, eating 
breakfast, etc. It is clear that even in this simple description it is natural to segment 
activity into meaningful units. Each of the units in this example can also be broken up 
into smaller units, and depending on the wording of instructions, it is possible for people 
to successfully segment activity at a desired grain of coarseness.  
 In the lab, event segmentation is often studied by asking participants to watch a 
short movie of an everyday event, such as a woman making breakfast. Participants are 
told to push a button every time they believe a meaningful unit of activity has occurred. 
Research has demonstrated that not only are participants reliable across time if they 
segment the same movie on multiple occasions, but that the locations of these event 
boundaries within a given movie also tend to be stable across participants and studies 
(Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby, 2006). Furthermore, there is strong evidence that people 
	   12	  
segment ongoing activity not only during laboratory tasks, but also during everyday life. 
In a study by Zacks et al. (2001), participants watched movies of everyday events while 
in an fMRI scanner. First, participants were told to simply watch the movies and learn as 
much about them as possible. Later, participants segmented the movie into meaningful 
events. The authors found that transient changes in activation occurred in the same brain 
areas during both passive viewing and active segmentation. Because the passive viewing 
task occurred before the authors introduced any mention of event segmentation, this 
study suggests that people segment ongoing activity spontaneously and effortlessly 
during every day life. 
 Event memory is strongly tied to the process of event segmentation. When people 
perceive an event boundary, memory for the previous event is shifted out of short-term 
memory and memory for the new event replaces it (Speer & Zacks, 2005; Swallow, 
Zacks, & Abrams, 2009). In addition, people tend to report stronger memories for what 
occurred at event boundaries than for activity occurring during an event (Newtson & 
Engquist, 1976; Schwan, Garsoffky, & Hesse, 2000). Furthermore, people who place 
event boundaries at normative locations tend to have better memories for what occurred 
during a movie. Although older adults tend to be more variable in their placement of 
event boundaries and typically have worse memory for what they have just watched than 
younger adults, older adults who segment like younger adults tend to remember events at 
the level of younger adults. Abnormal segmentation is therefore linked to decreased 
memory for segmented action sequences (Zacks et al., 2006).  
 Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, and Reynolds (2007) proposed Event 
Segmentation Theory (EST) to model the sequence of processes occurring during event 
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segmentation (Figure 1), and prediction plays a central role in this model. As people 
experience the world, sensory information enters the primary sensory areas of the brain 
and is processed into multi-modal representations of objects, motion, and characteristics 
of people. During this processing stage, the brain makes predictions about future inputs, 
and these predictions are maintained in the ACC. As an example, if one were watching 
the motion of a ball, one would likely predict that after the ball reaches the apex of its 
ascent, it would immediately begin descending toward the ground. In order to make these 
types of predictions, the brain must also rely on a multi-modal representation of “what is 
happening now” (Zacks et al., 2007, p. 274), called an event model. Importantly, event 
models are unaffected by transient changes in sensory input, and are therefore not 
disrupted when sensory input is interrupted. For example, when watching a juggler toss 
balls into the air, a passing person occluding the balls from view would not disrupt the 
event model holding one’s goal of watching the performance. However, event models are 
subject to input from event schemata, which hold semantic memory representations of 
typical sequences of events. For example, the event schema for tossing a ball into the air 
might be throwing the ball into the air, watching it reach its apex, paying attention to 
where it will coming down, reaching out one’s hand to catch it, and then repeating this 
sequence of actions. Event schemata can also hold information about the goals of other 
people and the statistical likelihood that action sequences within an event will follow a 
specific pattern. 
 In order for the brain to make valid predictions about future inputs, the event 
model and event schema must accurately represent the current state of the world. Error 
detection mechanisms in the dopaminergic areas of the brain compare the predictions 
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held in the ACC with the sensory information entering the brain. Normally, event models 
are good representations of what is happening in the world; however, when activity in the 
world becomes less predictable and event models are no longer as accurate, prediction 
errors accrue, triggering a gating mechanism that allows incoming sensory information to 
update the event model. As this occurs, prediction errors decrease, closing the gating 
mechanism and once again preventing transitory sensory information from influencing 
the event model. The periods of time between updates are perceived as events, and the 
transient periods of updating are perceived as event boundaries. 
 As discussed above, prediction and prediction error play an integral role in event 
processing, with the ACC hypothesized to be the brain area where these predictions are 
maintained. These mechanisms provide the critical link between event segmentation and 
PTSD. However, to our knowledge, there has been no research merging these two areas 
of study. Clearly, though, a greater understanding of how people with PTSD make 
predictions and process information could help clinicians and researchers gain further 
insight into the symptoms, such as hyperarousal, seen in people with PTSD. Therefore, 
the present study aimed to determine whether severity of PTSD symptoms, dissociation, 
and level of perceived social support predict performance on event segmentation and 
event memory tasks. Because previous research has demonstrated that people with PTSD 
often have other cognitive deficits, we sought to determine whether these relationships 
hold when controlling for level of education and general cognitive function.  
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Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited from a pool maintained by the 
Washington University Volunteer for Health program and from the St. Louis, MO and 
surrounding area community by advertising. All potential participants were screened over 
the phone and excluded from the study if they reported: (a) having a mental illness such 
as schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, bi-polar disorder, ADHD, autism, phobias, or sleep 
disorders, (b) having a neurological disorder, (c) currently taking anti-depressants other 
than SSRIs, or (d) taking benzodiazepine, lithium, or sleeping pills other than Lunesta or 
Ambien. Two hundred thirty-three adults (mean age = 49.2 years, range = 20-79) met the 
screening criteria and were recruited for the study. Eighty-eight of these participants were 
dropped from analysis because of failure to complete and/or return PTSD questionnaires 
(63; see Sargent et al., unpublished manuscript, for additional analyses that include these 
63 participants), inability to attend both study sessions within one week (8 participants), 
likely dementia (9 participants), missing segmentation data (5 participants), previous 
familiarity with the task (2 participants), and cheating on tasks (1 participant).   
One hundred forty-five participants (mean age = 50.17 years, range 20-79, 21-29 
participants in each decade) were included in the analysis. The mean age of the excluded 
participants did not differ from that of the included participants (t(231) = -1.089, p > .05). 
Thirteen of the excluded participants did not provide their level of education; however, 
for the data available, mean levels of education did differ between the included (mean = 
14.96) and excluded participants (mean difference = -0.77, t(218) = -2.115, p < .05). 
Finally, for the 63 excluded participants who completed the event segmentation task, the 
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included (mean = 0.6) and excluded participants did not differ in their performance on the 
event segmentation task (t(206) = -1.336, p > .05).  
Participants received $10 per hour of participation in the study, averaging to $50 
for completing the lab-based portion of the study and an additional $10 for agreeing to 
complete the PTSD and associated questionnaires. The procedure was explained fully to 
the participants, after which they provided written informed consent to participate in the 
study. This study received approval from the Washington University Human Resources 
Protection Office. 
Materials, Tasks, and Procedure. The study consisted of two sessions, each of 
which was approximately two-and-a-half hours long. Participants first viewed three 
movies of actors engaging in everyday activities: making breakfast (female actor, 329s 
duration), setting up for a party (male actor, 376s duration), and planting window boxes 
of plants (male actor, 354s duration). A fourth movie of a man building a boat from 
duplex blocks (155s duration) was used as practice. The movies were shot from a fixed 
head-height perspective without cuts or camera movement. Each movie began several 
seconds before the actor appeared on screen and ended several seconds after the actor left 
the scene. The movies were presented using PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & 
Provost, 1993) on Macintosh computers. While viewing these movies, participants 
engaged in an event segmentation task, for which they were told to push a button on the 
keyboard whenever they believed “one natural and meaningful unit of activity has ended 
and another has begun.” During this session, they were instructed to identify the largest 
possible meaningful units of activity. They were informed that there were no correct or 
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incorrect answers for this task. Participants practiced this task while watching the duplex 
blocks movie, and an experimenter answered any questions they raised.  
Following each movie, participants completed three memory tasks. Participants 
first completed a free recall task, in which they had seven minutes to write or type as 
much as they could remember from the movie in the order in which the activity occurred. 
Participants then completed a 20-trial recognition memory task on the computer. During 
each trial, two still images, one from the movie they just watched and one from a similar 
foil movie appeared next to each other on the screen. Participants indicated which still 
picture was from the movie they just watched by pressing a button on the keyboard. 
Finally, participants completed an order memory task. Twelve stills from the movie they 
just watched were placed on the table in a predetermined random order, and participants 
were instructed to arrange these images in temporal order as quickly as possible. 
 Participants then completed three working memory span tasks: reading span 
(Kane et al., 2007), operation span (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005), and 
symmetry span (Kane et al., 2007). For the reading span task, participants read and made 
judgments about sentences while remembering a sequence of letters presented one at a 
time after each sentence judgment. The operation span task required participants to solve 
math problems while remembering a sequence of letters presented one at a time after 
each math problem. For the symmetry task, participants indicated whether a grid pattern 
was symmetrical while remembering the sequence of locations of a red square on a 4x4 
grid.  
During the remainder of the first session, participants completed three tasks on the 
computer: a speed of processing task, a reading with distractions task (Connelly, Hasher, 
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& Zacks 1991), and a synonym and antonym vocabulary test (Salthouse, 1993). The 
speed of processing task required participants to pick which shape on a computer screen 
was most similar to a shape displayed at the top of the screen (Chen, Hale, & Myerson, 
2007). For the reading with distraction task, participants read aloud stories that were 
interspersed with either a series of Xs (control condition) or distracting words 
(experimental condition). Reading times on the two conditions were compared to 
determine how susceptible participants were to distraction. The synonym and antonym 
task simply required participants to provide synonyms or antonyms for lists of words. 
Between sessions one and two, participants filled out a packet of questionnaires 
containing the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006), the 
Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (Horne & Ostberg, 1976), a demographics 
questionnaire, and the AD8, a brief self-assessment questionnaire that can distinguish 
people with very mild dementia from people without dementia (Galvin, Roe, Coats, & 
Morris, 2007). 
 During the second session, participants first repeated the event segmentation task 
with the same movies, but this time were instructed to segment the movie into the 
smallest possible meaningful units of activity.  Participants then completed the first part 
of a selective reminding task (Buschke, 1984). For this task, the experimenter showed 
participants pictures of sixteen items to remember. Participants then recalled as many of 
the items as possible, after which the experimenter gave category cues to help 
participants remember the remaining items. Participants completed three trials of this 
task. Participants then completed letter and pattern comparison tasks (Salthouse & 
Babcock, 1991). For these tasks, participants were asked to determine whether two 
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strings of letters were the same or different and whether two patterns of lines were the 
same or different. Next, participants completed the Information and Picture Arrangement 
subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) III (Wechsler, 1997). Then, 
participants completed the Ruff Figural Fluency test (Ruff, Light, & Evans, 1987), which 
required them to create as many unique patterns as possible by drawing lines connecting 
dots. The experimenter then returned to the selective reminding task (after an 
approximately 30 minute delay), and instructed participants to recall as many of the 
original items as possible. Category clues were given for any items that were not 
immediately recalled. Next, participants completed the immediate recall portion of the 
Verbal Paired Associates subtest of the WAIS III followed by two trail-making tasks 
(Armitage, 1946). For the first trail-making task, participants were told to draw lines 
connecting twenty-five numbers in the correct numerical order, and the second task 
required participants to draw lines alternating between letters and numbers in the correct 
alphabetical and numerical sequence. Participants then completed a script elicitation task 
(Rosen, Caplan, Sheesley, Rodriguez, & Grafman, 2003), for which participants wrote 
down the sequence of steps associated with carrying out three common activities. 
Participants then completed a spatial memory task during which they watched a short 
movie of objects located around a park, and were later instructed to place icons of the 
named objects in the correct locations around the park. The experimenter then conducted 
the second part of the Verbal Paired Associates task (an approximately 30 minute delay). 
Afterwards, participants completed the Short Blessed Test (Morris et al., 1989), a 
screening test for dementia. Finally, participants completed two trials of the Victoria 
Longitudinal Study free recall task (Dixon & de Frias, 2004), for which they memorized 
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a list of thirty English nouns and then wrote down as many as they could remember. 
These methods are also discussed in detail in Sargent et al. (unpublished manuscript).  
After finishing these tasks of cognitive function, participants were asked if they 
were willing to participate in an additional part of the study. If they agreed, they signed 
an additional consent form approved by the Washington University Human Resources 
Protection Office. The experimenter then gave them a packet with PTSD-related 
questionnaires. Included in this packet were the Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire 
(TLEQ; Kubany et al., 2000), the PTSD Screening and Diagnostic Scale (PSDS; Kubany, 
Leisen, Kaplan, & Kelly, 2000), the Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences 
Questionnaire–Self Report Version (PDEQ; Marmar, Weiss, & Metzler, 1998), the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), and the 
Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & 
Farley, 1988). Also included in the packet was a list of treatment providers for PTSD and 
other disorders that are located in the St. Louis area, for use in the event that a participant 
experienced distress while completing the packet. 
 The TLEQ asked participants about twenty-two types of possible traumatic 
events. Participants reported whether they had experienced each type of event, the 
number of times they had experienced the event, whether they experienced fear, 
helplessness, or horror during the event, and whether they were seriously injured due to 
the event. They then indicated which of these events currently caused them the most 
distress. Participants were instructed to complete the PSDS using the event they indicated 
on the TLEQ. The PSDS is a thirty-eight item questionnaire designed to assess severity 
of PTSD symptoms. It has high internal consistency (alpha = 0.93), test-retest reliability 
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(r = .95), and convergent validity (Kubany, Leisen, Kaplan, & Kelly, 2000). PTSD 
symptom severity scores were calculated using scores on questions four through twenty-
three, for which participants rated on a five point scale the degree to which they had 
experienced each of seventeen symptoms of PTSD during the previous thirty days. PTSD 
symptom severity ratings can range from zero to eighty, and a score of seventeen or 
above indicates clinical levels of PTSD. 
 The PDEQ consists of ten questions asking about dissociative experiences that 
occurred at the time of the traumatic event participants identified on the TLEQ. The 
measure has reasonable internal consistency (alpha = 0.79; Birmes et al., 2003). Scores 
on the items were summed to generate a total score for this measure. The DES asks about 
twenty-eight dissociative symptoms that participants may experience during everyday 
life. The scale has high internal consistency (alpha = 0.93) and test-retest reliability (r = 
0.78-0.93), and good convergent and divergent validity (van Ijzendoorn & Schuengel, 
1996). Scores on this measure were summed to generate a total score for the DES. 
 The MSPSS is a twelve-item questionnaire that assesses levels of perceived social 
support. The scale has high internal consistency (alpha = 0.88) and test-retest reliability (r 
= 0.85). It also has strong factorial validity and good construct validity (Zimet et al., 
1998).  
Computing Segmentation Agreement. The time courses for each of the movies 
were divided into one-second bins, and the time points at which each participant 
segmented the movies were placed in the appropriate bins. This generated normative data 
indicating the locations at which participants were most likely to segment the movies. 
Each participant’s own segmentation was compared to the normative data to obtain a 
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segmentation agreement score. This score was then scaled to take into account the 
number of times each participant segmented the movies. The resulting scaled 
segmentation agreement scores were used for all analyses that included this variable. 
Scoring Event Memory Free Recall. Using methods similar to those described in 
Schwartz (1991), three experimenters independently viewed each movie and listed in fine 
grain every meaningful action performed by the actor in the movie. Participants received 
one point for every phrase in their free recall data that matched one of the units on the 
scoring template. The final event memory score for each participant was calculated by 
summing the points obtained for each movie and then averaging across movies. The order 
in which participants wrote these units was also recorded on the scoring template. Two 
independent experimenters coded free recall data from all three movies for 3 participants 
(kappa = 0.84). Interrater reliability was therefore determined to be sufficient, and one 
investigator scored all of the free recall data from the participants in the current study.  
 
Results 
PTSD Symptom Severity, Dissociation, and Perceived Social Support. PTSD 
symptom severity scores obtained from the PSDS ranged from 0 to 58. Forty-one 
participants had PTSD symptom severity scores equal to or greater than 17, the cutoff for 
clinical PTSD. Scores on the PDEQ ranged from 0 to 48, and scores on the DES ranged 
from 0 to 1761. Scores on the MSPSS ranged from 0 to 84. See Table 1 for the descriptive 
statistics for these measures and Figure 2 for the histograms of these distributions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There was one far outlier in the distribution of DES scores. However, after log 
transforming the data, this participant was no longer an outlier on this measure. In 
addition, running all of the analyses with this outlier excluded did not change the results 
reported here.	  
	   23	  
Because the distributions of scores on these questionnaires were highly non-normal, 
analyses were designed to account for this non-normality, as discussed below. 
Preliminary Analyses. To reduce error and loss of degrees of freedom in later 
analyses, we combined scores on the cognitive tasks described above into five composite 
variables: working memory, verbal episodic memory, general knowledge, executive 
function, and processing speed. See Table 2 for the tasks included in each composite 
variable as well as means and standard deviations for each variable. To create the 
composite variables, we z-scored the scores for each of the tasks and then averaged the 
resulting scores. However, because the measures of executive function did not form a 
latent variable in a confirmatory factor analysis (see Sargent et al., unpublished 
manuscript), this composite was dropped from further analyses. 
 Reliability for two measures of event memory—recognition memory and order 
memory—was low (Cronbach’s alpha of .47 and .5, respectively across the three 
movies); these tasks were therefore not included in the subsequent analyses. Event 
memory was therefore measured solely by performance on the free recall task 
(Cronbach’s alpha of .79 across the three movies). 
Five participants in this study did not provide data for their level of education. 
Missing values where therefore imputed using data from the non-PTSD-related measures 
of 208 participants (the participants in the present study in addition to the 63 participants 
who were excluded because they failed to return the PTSD-related measures) using the 
expectation maximization (EM) procedure in SPSS 19.0. 
 To determine whether to include age and education level in the analysis, we 
correlated these variables with PTSD symptom severity and segmentation agreement. We 
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found significant correlations between age and PTSD (r = -0.235, p < .05) and education 
level and PTSD (r=-0.225, p < .05). In addition, education level was significantly 
correlated with segmentation agreement (r=0.164, p < .05); however, age and 
segmentation agreement were not significantly correlated (r=-0.025, p > .05). Both of 
these variables were therefore included in the subsequent analyses. 
 To determine whether we could conduct a standard hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis, we checked the distribution of the age, education, PTSD symptom 
severity, dissociation, perceived social support and composite variables. All except for 
the PTSD symptom severity, dissociation, and perceived social support variables were 
normally distributed. Despite the non-normality of the predictors, the residual 
distributions were normal and homoschedastic, and parametric statistics were therefore 
used in the following analyses2.  
Predicting Segmentation Agreement. Age was entered first into the equation, 
followed by education. The four composite variables were then entered into the equation. 
Together, these variables accounted for 17.6% of the variance in segmentation agreement 
(p < .05). When PTSD symptom severity was added into the model after these variables, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  To test the strength of our conclusions, we also conducted permutation analyses to 
obtain empirical distributions for the expectations of the regression parameters under the 
null hypothesis. For each variable of interest, we shuffled the scores for each participant 
and randomly assigned each participant one of these shuffled scores. This created a 
random distribution of scores that maintained the same skewed distribution as the original 
variable. The shuffled variables were then used in multiple regression analyses. Of 
interest in these analyses was whether the change in R-square obtained from adding the 
variable of interest to the regression equation was significant. We ran 10,000 iterations of 
each test to create a distribution of R-square change values that would be expected 
assuming the dependent measure was unrelated to the independent measures. R-square 
change values obtained from the original variable were determined to be significant if 
they fell in the 5% tail of the permuted R-square change distribution.  The results of the 
analyses remained the same using this non-parametric test.	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it accounted for an additional 4% of the variance in segmentation agreement (p < .05)3. 
When the two dissociation scores were entered into the model after age, education, and 
the composite variables, dissociation explained an additional 4.4% of the variance in 
segmentation agreement (p < .05). However, most of the explained variance was due to 
scores on the DES, and when the PDEQ was removed from the model, scores on the DES 
explained 4.3% of the variance in segmentation agreement (p < .05). Because PTSD 
symptom severity and scores on the DES and PDEQ were highly correlated, neither 
variable explained additional significant variance when entered after the other, though 
together they accounted for a total of 6.2% of the variance in segmentation agreement. 
We entered perceived social support last into the model, after age, education, the 
composite variables, PTSD symptom severity, and the dissociation scores, and found that 
social support accounted for an additional 3.8% of the variance in segmentation 
agreement (p < .05). The model therefore explained a total of 27.6% of the variance in 
segmentation agreement4. See Figures 3-5 for scatter plots of the correlations between 
PTSD, dissociation, and perceived social support with segmentation agreement5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  To test the strength of this conclusion, we progressively deleted data points from the 
positive tail of the PTSD distribution to determine whether outliers on this scale were 
artificially inflating the correlation between PTSD and segmentation agreement. We 
found that 7.5% of these data points could be deleted (11 subjects) before the correlation 
became non-significant. 
 
4 In these models, perceived social support was entered last because it was the most 
exploratory of the variables tested in these analyses. However, when perceived social 
support was entered into the model before PTSD symptom severity, the coefficients for 
both perceived social support and PTSD symptom severity remained significant. The 
same pattern held when MSPSS scores were entered before DES scores. 
 
5 There was one outlier in the distribution for segmentation agreement. The analyses 
reported above include this outlier in the data. However, when this outlier was removed 
from the data, all of the results described above remained significant.	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Predicting Event Memory. Again, age was entered first into the equation, 
followed by education and the five composite variables. Together, these variables 
accounted for 40.5% of the variance in event memory. Neither PTSD nor dissociation 
explained additional unique variance in event memory, though together they explained 
1% of the variance in event memory. On the other hand, perceived social support did 
account for an additional 2.6% of the variance in event memory (p < .05). In total, the 
model explained 44.1% of the variance in event memory. See Figure 6 for a scatter plot 
of the correlation between perceived social support and event memory. 
PTSD Symptom Severity Correlated with Cognitive Functioning, Perceived Social 
Support, and Dissociation. We conducted bivariate correlations between PTSD and each 
of the four composite variables. Only the general knowledge composite variable was 
significantly correlated with PTSD symptom severity (r = -0.210, p < .05). See Table 3 
for the correlation coefficients and significance tests between PTSD symptom severity 
and the composite variables. The relationship between PTSD and perceived level of 
social support was significant (r = -0.22, p < .05). In addition, the interaction between 
perceived social support and PTSD symptom severity did not explain any additional 
variance in segmentation agreement when entered into a regression equation after age, 
the composite variables, PTSD centered around its mean, and perceived level of social 
support centered around its mean. Finally, PTSD symptom severity was significantly 
correlated with scores on the DES (r = 0.42, p < .05) and scores on the PDEQ (r=0.53, p 
< .05).  
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Discussion 
Our results revealed that even after controlling for age, level of education, and 
general cognitive function, PTSD symptom severity, trait dissociation, and level of 
perceived social support significantly predicted event segmentation performance. Level 
of perceived social support also predicted event memory performance.  
Severity of PTSD Symptoms, Segmentation Agreement, and Event Memory. Our 
finding that severity of PTSD predicts event segmentation agreement supports our 
hypothesis, and is in accord with the literature on PTSD and on event segmentation. As 
many imaging studies of PTSD patients demonstrate, the rostral ACC displays lower 
levels of activity in participants with PTSD versus controls during a variety of tasks 
related to traumatic events, whereas the dorsal ACC displays increased levels of activity 
in people with PTSD during tasks that are more cognitive in nature. Although, to our 
knowledge, there has not been any research on dorsal ACC activation in people with 
PTSD during tasks involving prediction, research on the ACC in other domains has found 
that dorsal ACC is activated at times of greater prediction error. This finding links the 
PTSD and ACC literature to that of event segmentation. Prediction and prediction error 
play an integral role in event segmentation: indicating where people should place an 
event boundary. Our finding that PTSD symptom severity predicts event segmentation 
performance suggests that people with PTSD may employ non-normative prediction 
processes, and therefore segment and process information differently, than people 
without PTSD. Future research should determine whether people with PTSD display 
differences on tasks explicitly testing prediction ability compared to people without 
PTSD. In addition, future studies should employ functional imaging to determine whether 
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the ACC shows decreased activation in participants with PTSD during event 
segmentation and explicit prediction tasks.  
These results also have implications for understanding the mechanisms involved 
in PTSD. Although more research in this area is necessary, it is possible that some people 
who experience a traumatic event experience neural changes, specifically decreased 
activation in the rostral ACC and hyperactivation of the dorsal ACC, that may alter the 
way they perceive both their initial traumatic event and later events. Hyperactivation of 
the dorsal ACC may contribute to an increase in errors of prediction, possibly leading 
people with PTSD to be chronically hypervigilant in their search for danger. At the same 
time, lower levels of activation in the rostral ACC may lead people with PTSD to display 
less attention to environmental indicators of safety. These information processing errors 
may be reflected in and possibly augmented by the non-normative segmentation 
displayed by people with a higher severity of PTSD symptoms. 
Though this mechanism postulates that experiencing a traumatic event leads to 
neural changes in the ACC, another plausible mechanism is that people who already 
display lower activation of the rostral ACC and hyperactivation of the dorsal ACC before 
experiencing a traumatic event are at a higher risk for developing PTSD. If correctly 
processing and understanding events requires normative ACC activation and event 
segmentation performance, people who have deficits in these areas may be predisposed to 
develop PTSD, a syndrome that by definition involves a failure to interpret events in an 
adaptive manner. 
Surprisingly, we found that PTSD symptom severity did not predict event 
memory and that the five composite variables were not significantly related to PTSD 
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symptom severity, findings at odds with much of the literature on cognitive functioning 
and PTSD. It is possible, however, that we would have found correlations between PTSD 
symptom severity and memory had we used the same measures used in previous studies. 
Yehuda et al. (1995) found that immediate memory for a word list was not impaired in 
combat veterans with PTSD; however, delayed recall after interference from a second 
word list was impaired in the participants with PTSD. However, because the composite 
variables included a variety of semantic memory and working memory tasks, though not 
necessarily the exact tasks described in previous studies, this explanation may be less 
compelling. 
A more likely explanation is that these discrepant findings may be due to the fact 
that the distribution of the PTSD symptom severity scores in this study was highly 
negatively skewed, with relatively few people above the clinical cutoff for PTSD. 
Although the statistics used to analyze this data were not affected by the skew of the data, 
it is possible that there were not enough people with clinical PTSD in this study to 
replicate the results of previous studies of clinical populations. Perhaps people with 
subclinical levels of PTSD display difficulty with event segmentation but do not have 
impairments at a level that significantly affects their memory. Future research on event 
segmentation and memory in a population with a greater proportion of people with 
clinical levels of PTSD would help to elucidate these surprising findings.  
Another possible reason why we failed to find a relationship between PTSD and 
event memory may be that the movies in this study were unlikely to activate participants’ 
traumatic memories. Previous studies have found the robust result that rostral ACC is less 
active in people with PTSD, and it is therefore likely that people with PTSD would 
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display even more difficulty on event segmentation tasks if their traumatic memories 
were activated during the task. This could be implemented either by activating 
participants’ traumatic memory before they watch and segment the movies or by 
including movies with scenes related to their traumatic event. It is possible that increased 
difficulty with event segmentation would lead to a stronger relationship between PTSD 
symptom severity and event memory. Future studies are necessary to test this claim. 
Despite the fact that we did not find a significant relationship between PTSD and 
event memory in this study, understanding how people with PTSD segment ongoing 
activity may still be relevant for understanding PTSD patients’ memory complaints. The 
non-normative event segmentation we found in people with a higher severity of PTSD 
symptoms likely affects them not only during the lab-based segmentation tasks, but also 
during everyday life. Because previous studies have found a strong relationship between 
event segmentation and memory, it is possible that people with severe PTSD would 
display memory difficulties in their daily lives because of their difficulty processing 
ongoing activity. Future studies that include a greater number of people with more severe 
PTSD would be helpful to further elucidate this relationship. 
These results may also inform treatment for PTSD. If the mechanism involved in 
segmentation were disrupted in people with PTSD, perhaps training in event 
segmentation could help reset the mechanism and restore normative event processing. For 
example, it may be possible to have people view movies that have been previously 
segmented by a non-patient sample while providing explanations for each boundary 
placement. People could later practice segmenting movies while receiving feedback to 
help them learn to segment more normatively. Future research is necessary to determine 
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whether this form of training is effective and whether learning to segment specific 
movies transfers to the segmentation of other movies and stimuli.  
Dissociation, Segmentation Agreement, and Event Memory. Our finding that 
scores on both of the dissociation measures were correlated with PTSD was not 
surprising, given the existing literature on PTSD and dissociation. However, our finding 
that scores on the DES predict segmentation agreement was novel, and is not, to our 
knowledge, present elsewhere in the literature. The DES measures trait dissociation, and 
includes many items about experiences that involve lack of attention to the present 
situation. Although more research is necessary, it is possible that this type of dissociation 
is associated with people paying less attention to incoming activity, and therefore failing 
to process the information in a normative way. This could translate into difficulty with 
event segmentation, as this task requires people to pay constant attention to stimuli and 
continuously process the events occurring within the movies. The PDEQ also asks about 
experiences similar to these, and it is therefore surprising that it does not also predict 
segmentation agreement. One possibility for this finding may be that because the PDEQ 
only asks about experiences at the time of the traumatic event, it does not capture 
processes that are still present at the time of testing. In addition, the PDEQ is a 
retrospective measure that assumes participants have a veridical memory for their 
experiences during their traumatic event. It is therefore possible that scores on the PDEQ 
gathered closer to the time of the traumatic would predict later performance on event 
segmentation tasks. Furthermore, it is unclear why scores on the DES fail to predict event 
memory. People who display difficulty with processing incoming information would also 
be expected to have greater difficulty remembering this information. As discussed above 
	   32	  
for PTSD symptom severity, it is possible that the participants in this sample do not 
display dissociation that is severe enough to affect memory. Future research with 
populations with more severe dissociative symptoms could help elucidate these results.  
Perceived Social Support, Segmentation Agreement, and Event Memory. The 
results of this study suggest that level of perceived social support predicts both 
segmentation agreement and event memory after controlling for PTSD symptom severity. 
Consistent with previous studies, level of perceived social support also was significantly 
correlated with PTSD symptom severity. However, the interaction between perceived 
level of social support and PTSD symptom severity did not explain significant variance 
in segmentation agreement, meaning that having both high PTSD and low social support 
is not associated with significantly less normative segmentation agreement than the main 
effects suggest on their own.  
These findings are surprising because it is unclear why perceived social support 
should relate to segmentation agreement and event memory independently of PTSD 
symptom severity, particularly because the movies used in this study involved single 
actors who did not engage in any explicit social interactions. Though there are few 
studies that have examined the relationship between social support and memory, Lakey & 
Cassady (1990) found that higher levels of perceived social support predicted better 
memory for positive supportive behaviors. In addition, Mueser, Bellack, Douglas, & 
Wade (1991) found that worse memory predicted pretreatment social skill impairments in 
patients with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, but not affective disorder, 
providing some evidence for a relationship between memory and social support. In 
addition, Stiller & Dunbar (2007) suggest that maintaining a social network requires 
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maintaining and updating a constantly shifting mental representation of relationships 
between individuals, which clearly involves memory. In this study, participants heard 
seven short stories that involved social situations and were then required to answer 
questions testing their memory for the stories. They found that memory for the stories 
significantly predicted the size of participants’ primary social network (individuals 
participants contacted at least once a month).  
The present study adds to the literature on social support and memory and 
suggests that social support also predicts memory for activities that are not explicitly 
social. It is possible that people who are less normative in their ability to segment non-
social activity into meaningful events have the same difficulty segmenting social activity 
into meaningful units. These people might therefore have worse memory for social 
relationships, leading to a smaller social network and less perceived social support. 
Alternatively, it is possible that engaging in numerous social interactions allows people to 
practice segmenting information in a context where they can also compare their 
interpretations of events with those of others, helping them to become more normative in 
their segmentation. Further research is necessary to provide support for these hypotheses. 
Overall, this study provides support for our hypothesis that PTSD predicts event 
segmentation agreement, meaning that people with higher severity of PTSD symptoms 
are less normative in their placement of event boundaries. In addition, trait dissociation 
predicts segmentation agreement, implying that dissociation may hamper people’s ability 
to process incoming information. Finally, level of perceived social support predicts both 
segmentation agreement and event memory, suggesting that people’s processing and 
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memory of ongoing activity may influence the size of their social networks and therefore 
their perception of their available social support.  
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Tables and Figures: 
 
 
PTSD and Associated 
Measures Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
PSDS 12.54 14.83 1.36 1.02 
PDEQ 18.8 9.06 1.1 0.476 
DES 23.83 25.83 2.73 10.72 
MSPSS 62.84 17.61 -1.06 0.63 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for PTSD and Associated Measures. PSDS = PTSD 
Screening and Diagnostic Scale; PDEQ = Peritraumatic Dissociative Experiences 
Questionnaire; DES: Dissociative Experiences Scale; MSPSS = Multidimensional Scale 
of Perceived Social Support. 
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Constructs and Measures Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
Working Memory:         
Reading Span 20.84 6.00 -1.01 0.58 
Operation Span 19.95 6.99 -0.78 -0.592 
Symmetry Span 12.30 6.51 0.24 -0.71 
Laboratory Episodic Memory:         
Selective Reminding: 46.92 6.93 -0.22 -0.39 
Verbal Paired Associates 18.13 3.98 -0.45 -0.46 
Word List Recall 18.10 5.55 -0.46 -0.18 
Executive Function:         
Reading with Distraction 0.48 0.24 1.41 3.06 
Trail Making 1.33 0.74 1.26 2.73 
Ruff Figural Fluency 74.39 24.54 0.209 -0.36 
Processing Speed:         
Shape Comparison 0.99 0.27 0.72 0.88 
Letter Comparison 7.14 1.91 0.57 0.24 
Pattern Comparison 12.78 2.78 0.52 0.32 
General Knowledge:         
Information Test 18.69 5.28 -0.69 -0.23 
Synonym Vocabulary 0.57 0.29 -0.10 -1.02 
Antonym Vocabulary 0.55 0.29 -0.06 -1.07 
Event Memory 27.68 11.65 0.33 0.02 
Segmentation Agreement‡ 0.60 0.08 -1.00 2.01 
Education (years) 14.90 2.53 -0.28 -0.10 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Composite Measures. Mean scores are proportion 
correct except: Span scores are total number of items correct on trials with correct 
response on processing task; Reading with Distraction = (Iow distraction – high 
distraction)/(low distraction) reading times; Trail Making = (B – A)/A time to 
completion; Ruff = total unique designs; Letter and Pattern Comparison are total number 
of items completed in 20 seconds; and Shape Comparision is the average time in seconds 
to complete 1 trial . 
‡ When the outlier is removed, the distribution has skew = -0.585 and kurtosis = 0.085. 
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficients and Significance Tests Between PTSD Symptom 
Severity and the Four Composite Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of Event Segmentation Theory.  From Zacks et al. (2007). 
r p
-0.105 0.208
-0.068 0.419
-0.181 0.030
-0.043 0.607
PTSD Severity
Working Memory
Composite Variables
Verbal Episodic Memory
General Knowledge
Processing Speed
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Figure 2: Distributions of scores on the PSDS, MSPSS, DES, and PDEQ. All four of 
these distributions are clearly non-normally distributed. Although the residual 
distributions were normally distributed and homoschedastic, we conducted permutation 
analyses in addition to parametric analyses to acertain the robustness of our findings.  
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Figure 3. PTSD symptom severity was significantly correlated with segmentation 
agreement (r = -0.27, p < .05). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Scores on the Dissociative Experiences Scale were significantly correlated with 
segmentation agreement (r = -0.259, p < .05) 
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Figure 5. Scores on the Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support were 
significantly correlated with segmentation agreement (r = 0.280, p < .05). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Scores on the Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support were 
significantly correlated with event memory (r = 0.210, p < .05). 
